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Abstract
This paper investigates how banking system stability is affected when we combine Is-
lamic and conventional finance under the same roof. We compare systemic resilience
of three types of banks in six GCC member countries with dual banking systems:
fully-fledged Islamic banks (IB), purely conventional banks (CB) and conventional
banks with Islamic windows (CBw). We employ market-based systemic risk mea-
sures such as MES, SRISK and CoVaR to identify which sector is more vulnerable
to a systemic event. We also compute weighted average GES to determine which
sector is most synchronised with the market. Moreover, we use graphical network
models to determine the most interconnected banking sector that can more easily
spread a systemic shock to the whole system. Using a sample of observations on 79
publicly traded banks operating over the 2005-2014 period, we find that CBw is the
least resilient sector to a systemic event, it has the highest synchronicity with the
market, and it is the most interconnected banking sector during crisis times.
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1. Introduction1
Since its inception in 1970s, Islamic banking has expanded very rapidly into many2
Muslim countries1. This trend has transformed the structure of banking industry in3
several Muslim countries to a dual system, in which Islamic banks operate alongside4
their conventional counterparts and provide financial services that are compatible to5
the religious belief of devout individuals, and thereby facilitate access to finance for6
a wider population.7
8
Alongside the rapid growth of Islamic banking, researchers have extensively exam-9
ined various aspect of this innovation. In particular, its standalone risks such as10
credit, insolvency, market, liquidity and interest rate risks have been investigated11
in the literature (Abedifar et al., 2013; Cˇiha´k and Hesse, 2010; Erge and Arslan,12
2013; Fakhfekh et al., 2016; Hasan and Dridi, 2011; Pappas et al., 2017). Surpris-13
ingly, however, the impact of introducing Islamic banking on resilience of financial14
system has attracted little attention from academia, whereas the recent financial15
crisis asserted the inadequacy of micro-prudential regulations and highlighted the16
importance of macro-prudential policies in identifying emerging systemic events and17
containing them before they materialize (Ioannidou et al., 2015).18
19
This paper seeks to fill the void and explores the systemic importance of Islamic20
banking and the stability of dual banking systems. This is worthwhile to explore21
given that the rapid transformation of financial systems in several Muslim countries22
has already attracted the attention of policy makers and market participants towards23
the consequence for systemic risk and financial stability of having dual banking sys-24
tems. For instance, Qatari regulators were the first to react to this phenomenon.25
In 2010, they restricted activities of commercial banks that offer both Islamic and26
conventional banking, and in 2011, they ultimately banned conventional banks from27
providing Islamic financial products2.28
29
There are two channels for provision of Islamic banking services to the society: a) Is-30
lamic branches or windows of conventional banks (CBw), and b) fully fledged Islamic31
1According to the Islamic Financial Services Board report (IFSB, 2015), Islamic banking has
experienced a double-digit growth in recent years, and the assets managed under this new technology
have reached $1.9 trillion in 2014.
2https://www.ft.com/content/0ab164e0-3858-11e0-8257-00144feabdc0
2
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banks (IB). The choice between these two options can affect the banking system sta-32
bility. In the former case, existing conventional banks (CB) can exploit economies of33
scope and scale by establishing Islamic branches and combining Islamic with conven-34
tional banking. The banking system will then consist of a pool of similarly diversified35
consolidated banks with a portfolio of clients that have different religious conscious-36
ness. In the latter case, instead, banks will focus on either Islamic or conventional37
products, and religious diversity will be observed across banks. Under this scenario,38
a portfolio of different but less diversified individual banks will form the banking39
system.40
41
In this paper, we address the consequence of these alternative banking system con-42
figurations on financial stability. The link between financial systems architecture43
and systemic risk is an ongoing debate among regulators and researchers even in44
advanced economies. In particular, theoretical debates and empirical evidence on45
the link between bank consolidation and financial system stability is still ambiguous46
(Chu, 2015). The extant literature underscores the importance of the structure of47
financial systems in forming systemic events (Acemoglu et al., 2015; Gofman, 2017;48
Roukny et al., 2016; Silva et al., 2016, among others), and highlights that financial49
institutions have become more homogeneous and intertwined3. Wagner (2010) points50
out that the increasing homogeneity of financial institutions may increase stability of51
each individual financial institution but, from a macro prudential viewpoint, it makes52
them vulnerable to the same risks, as they become more similar to each other. He in-53
dicates that there is a trade-off between a lower probability of an idiosyncratic failure54
and a higher probability of a systemic adverse event. In a related work, Ibragimov55
et al. (2011) show that diversification for individual institutions might be subopti-56
mal for a banking system. Paul Volcker, the former Fed chairman, said “the risk57
of failure of large, interconnected firms must be reduced, whether by reducing their58
size, curtailing their interconnections, or limiting their activities” (Volcker, 2012).59
Richard Fisher, the CEO of Fed Dallas argued that “I favour an international accord60
that would break up these institutions into more manageable size” (Fisher, 2011).61
As a result, we observe that post-crisis regulatory reforms in Europe and the US62
(such as Dodd Frank Act, 2011; Erkki Liikanen Report, 2012) recommend restrict-63
ing activities or structure of large financial institutions to mitigate their complexity64
3This is because of the inclination for holding market portfolio, which is recommended by modern
portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952), and the de-regulations in Europe and the US following the
Second Banking Directive of 1989 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999).
3
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and interconnectedness.65
66
In this paper, we study the banking systems of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)67
member countries: Bahrain (BH), Kuwait (KW), Oman (OM), Qatar (QA), Saudi68
Arabia (SA), and the United Arab Emirates (AE). These countries hold nearly 40% of69
the total global Islamic banking assets, and a significant market share of the Islamic70
banking sector (IFSB, 2016). Moreover, they are a homogeneous sample of countries,71
whereas recent studies show significant cross-country variations in the performance72
of Islamic banks across Muslim countries due to different institutional environments73
(see eg. Bitar et al., 2017). These six countries have a similar Muslim share in74
population and a similar economic environment. In addition, the six countries have75
economies that are mostly oil dependent and are thus similarly vulnerable to the neg-76
ative impact of the global crisis through oil price fluctuations. Oil revenue accounts77
for almost 48% of the GCC countries GDP (Sturm et al., 2008). Furthermore, it is78
found that the oil index volatility has a spillover effect on the stock market return79
in the GCC region (see e.g. Arouri and Rault, 2012; Arouri et al., 2011; Fayyad and80
Daly, 2011; Maghyereh and Al-Kandari, 2007; Mohanty et al., 2011; Zarour, 2006),81
which enables us to use the crude oil (WTI) index as a unified volatility index for82
all countries and test the robustness of our results.83
84
We use a rigorous and robust methodology in our analysis. We employ “Standard”85
market based measures that include MES, SRISK and ∆CoVaR to gauge systemic86
risk of IB, CB and CBw sectors. All measures are based on the DCC-GARCH model87
introduced by Engle (2002). This h lps to address the distortion in correlation coef-88
ficients, caused by heteroskedasticity in periods of high volatility such as crisis times89
(see e.g Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Caporale et al., 2005; Cappiello et al., 2006; Ronn90
et al., 2009). Moreover, we extend the DCC approach by using partial correlation91
coefficients to exclude the impact of other assets in the market on computing the co-92
movements between two assets. We also use the crude oil WTI returns as a unified93
volatility index for all countries. We examine banking sectors’ synchronicity with94
the market by applying the Component Expected Shortfall technique introduced by95
Banulescu and Dumitrescu (2015). Finally, we employ a novel application of the96
graphical network models, described in Giudici and Spelta (2016), to identify the97
most interconnected banking sector.98
99
The results of our analysis, based on daily stock returns of 79 publicly traded banks100
and bank holding companies over the period 2005-2014, indicate that the CBw sec-101
4
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tor is the least resilient sector, has the highest synchronicity with the market and102
the greatest importance in destabilising the financial system of the GCC countries.103
In addition, the graphical network model well describes the interconnections among104
banking systems of different countries. It shows that the CBw sector, especially105
during crisis periods, is the most interconnected sector, whereas the IB depicts a106
negative correlation with the CB sector, indicating diversification benefits of having107
both in a system.108
109
This paper contributes to the Islamic banking literature. It provides significant evi-110
dence on the relative importance of Islamic banking in the configuration of financial111
systems, and thereby mitigation or resonance of systemic risk. The existing litera-112
ture has shown differences between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of asset113
growth (Hasan and Dridi, 2011), bank-firm relationship (Ongena and lkay endeniz114
Ync, 2011), business orientation (Shaban et al., 2014), corporate social responsi-115
bility (Mallin et al., 2014), credit risk (Abedifar et al., 2013; Baele et al., 2014),116
customer loyalty and interest rate risk (Abedifar et al., 2013; Aysan et al., 2014),117
efficiency (Abdul-Majid et al., 2011a,b, 2009; Al-Jarrah and Molyneux, 2006; Johnes118
et al., 2015), insolvency risk (Cˇiha´k and Hesse, 2010; Pappas et al., 2017) and market119
power (Weill, 2011). Such differences stimulate the overall performance of dual bank-120
ing systems (Abedifar et al., 2016; Gheeraert and Weill, 2015; Gheeraert, 2014). In121
view of the existing literature, our work unravel that the mechanism of introducing122
Islamic banking can affect stability and resilience of dual banking systems against123
systemic events.124
125
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two outlines our hy-126
potheses, methodology and statistical Specifications. Section three describes the127
data and summary statistics. Section four discuss our empirical findings. The final128
Section provides summary and concluding remarks.129
2. Hypotheses, Methodology and Statistical Specifications130
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) are defined by Finanacial Sta-131
bility Board (2011) as “financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure,132
because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause sig-133
nificant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity”. In a similar134
vein, our aim is to identify the Systemically Important Financial Sectors by testing135
5
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the following three hypotheses:136
137
Hypothesis 1: CBw has the highest systemic risk.138
Hypothesis 2: CBw has the highest synchronicity with the market.139
Hypothesis 3: CBw is the most interconnected sector.140
141
To empirically test the first hypothesis, we compute systemic risk measures for each142
banking sector. We use Component Expected Shortfall approach to gauge syn-143
chronicity of banking sectors and the market index. Finally, we employ graphical144
network models to examine the third hypothesis.145
146
Existing theories have conflicting predictions on these hypotheses. Earlier studies147
(see e.g. Allen and Gale, 2000; Freixas et al., 2000) suggest that financial resilience148
increases in a more interconnected system, because the loss of a failure is distributed149
among more creditors. However, recent studies have a different prediction. Blume150
et al. (2013) argue that in a highly interconnected financial system, the likelihood of151
emerging a systemic event increases. Gai et al. (2011) claim that financial stability152
declines with an increase in the complexity of the financial network. Castiglionesi153
et al. (2017) show that greater financial integration is associated with a more stable154
interbank interest rate in normal times, but it leads to larger interest rate spikes in155
crisis times.156
2.1. Systemic Risk Measures157
We employ several commonly used systemic risk measures for our analysis. We use158
the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of Acharya et al. (2010), and the systemic159
risk measure (SRISK) of Acharya et al. (2012), extended by Brownlees and Engle160
(2017), to investigate the banking sectors resilience or vulnerability under a systemic161
stress event. In addition, we investigate the contribution of the banking sectors162
to the system risk using the Delta Conditional Value-at-Risk (∆CoVaR) of Adrian163
and Brunnermeier (2016). These measures are extensions of the two standard risk164
measures, the Value at Risk (VaR) and the Expected Shortfall (ES), and are often165
used to identify the Systemically Important Financial Institutions. Here we extend166
the application of these measures at the aggregate banking system level, to identify167
the vulnerability or the systemic importance of different banking sectors.168
6
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2.1.1. Marginal Expected Shortfall169
MES evaluates the sensitivity of a financial entity to a change in the system’s Ex-170
pected Shortfall. More precisely, it is the one day capital loss expected if the market171
returns are less than a given threshold C (such as C = −2%). In our context, MES172
can be expressed as a function of the tail expectations for a country market index173
standardized return εjt and of the tail expectations for the banking sector standard-174
ized idiosyncratic return ξsjt:175
MESsjt(C) = σsjt ρsjt Et−1(εjt|εjt < C
σjt
) + σsjt
√
1− ρ2sjt Et−1(ξsjt|εjt <
C
σjt
),
where σsjt is the (time dependent) volatility of the aggregate returns of sector s176
in country j, σjt is the (time dependent) volatility of the market index returns of177
country j and, finally, ρsjt is the (time dependent) correlation between the aggregate178
returns of sector s in country j and the corresponding market index returns in coun-179
try j. From an economic viewpoint, a higher MES indicates a higher vulnerability180
of a banking sector of a certain country to a systemic event.181
182
2.1.2. SRISK183
The SRISK measure was introduced by Acharya et al. (2012), and extended by184
Brownlees and Engle (2017). SRISK extends MES to take into account idiosyncratic185
firm characteristics, as it explicitly accounts for a financial institution’s leverage186
and size. It measures the expected capital shortage faced by a financial institution187
during a period of distress, when the market declines substantially. The measure188
combines high frequency market data (daily stock prices and market capitalizations)189
with low frequency balance sheet data (leverage) to provide a daily SRISK estimation.190
Following Acharya et al. (2012), the quantification of SRISK requires: the regulatory191
minimum capital ratio k (here we take k = 8%), the book value of debt D (here we192
consider the total liabilities), the equity market capitalization value MV and the193
long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES), which represents the expected loss194
for the equity of a financial entity under a crisis, during which the aggregate market195
declines significantly in a six-month period. LRMES is approximated with daily196
MES, such that LRMES ' 1− exp(−18×MES), using the threshold C fixed at197
C = −40%. SRISK for institution i at time t is then defined by:198
7
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SRISKit = max
[
0;
(
k(Dit + (1− LRMESit)MVit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Required Capital
− (1− LRMESit)MVit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Available Capital
)]
Note that using leverage definition Lit = (Dit+MVit)/MVit, SRISK can be rewritten199
as:200
SRISKit = max
(
0;
[
kLit − 1 + (1− k)LRMESit
]
wit
)
,
which shows that higher leverage and higher market capitalization will increase201
SRISK. In our context, we aim to calculate SRISK of banking systems, rather than202
that of financial institutions. SRISK of a banking sector is equal to the sum of203
SRISK of its related banks as SRISK can be linearly aggregated (see Acharya et al.,204
2012). From an economical viewpoint, the banking sector with the largest positive205
SRISK has the highest capital shortfall and, therefore, will be the greatest contrib-206
utor to systemic risk. On the other hand, negative values of SRISK indicate capital207
surpluses.208
2.1.3. ∆CoVaR209
∆CoVaR was introduced by Adrian an Brunnermeier (2016) as an upgrade of the210
Value at Risk concept. It is based on the calculation of the VaR of a market portfolio211
return, conditional on the observed return level of a financial entity i. More precisely,212
∆CoVaR of i reflects its contribution to systemic risk by assessing the difference213
between the VaR of the system, conditional on the returns of i at their VaR level,214
and the VaR of the system, conditional on the returns of i at the median level.215
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) set the VaR level at the 5% probability quantile,216
and use quantile regression to derive the conditional VaRs of the system. To extend217
the measure at the banking system level, we can calculate the VaR of a country218
banking system j, conditional on its sectors’ return levels, using aggregate banking219
system returns, and obtain ∆CoV aRjt as:220
∆CoV aRjt = V aR(rj|rsjt = V aR(rsj))− V aR(rj|rsjt = Median(rsj))
From an economic viewpoint, a higher level of ∆CoVaR indicates a higher contribu-221
tion from a banking sector to the systemic risk level of a country’s financial system.222
8
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2.1.4. Component Expected Shortfall223
To assess the vulnerability at the country level, we follow Banulescu and Dumitrescu224
(2015), who propose the Component Expected Shortfall measure, from which the ex-225
pected shortfall of a system is measured by linearly aggregating the expected short-226
falls of the individual components. In a similar fashion, we compute the Global227
Expected Shortfall (GES) of a country j as a linear aggregation of the expected228
shortfall of its banking sectors:229
GESjt =
S∑
s=1
wsjtMESsjt
in which wsjt = MVsjt/
∑S
s=1MVsjt represents the weight of the banking sector s in230
country j at time t, given by its market capitalization value MVsjt relative to the231
aggregate capitalization of the country banking system
∑S
s=1MVsjt; whereas S is the232
number of considered sectors (in our context, S = 3). Economically, a higher GES233
indicates a higher vulnerability of a (country-specific) market to a systemic event.234
Note that the GES is the sum of each banking sector’s contribution and, therefore, it235
helps understanding the synchronicity of each sector to the whole market: the larger236
weight of a component in the sum indicates its higher synchronicity.237
2.2. Graphical Network Models238
The study of cross-border interconnectedness can help us to identify the transmis-239
sion channels of financial distress across national borders (Tonzer, 2015). Therefore,240
besides calculating systemic importance and synchronicity of banking sectors, we241
examine their linkages, in order to detect the pattern of diffusion of systemic risk242
among them. To achieve this objective we follow Billio et al. (2012), and consider a243
cross-sectional analysis to produce a correlation network structure that can describe244
the mutual relationships between the banking sectors. More specifically, we follow245
Giudici and Spelta (2016) and employ a graphical network model based on condi-246
tional independence relationships described by partial correlations. We extend their247
analysis by considering the banking sectors of the different countries as graphical248
nodes, and the systemic risk measures previously described as random variables as-249
sociated to each node.250
251
More formally, let X = (X1, ..., XN) ∈ RN be a N− dimensional random vector of252
(standardised) systemic risk measures for the N considered banking sectors, where253
9
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N is equal to S×J , the number of sectors times the number of countries (3×6 in our254
context). We assume that X is distributed according to a multivariate normal distri-255
bution NN (0,Σ), where Σ is the correlation matrix, which we assume not singular.256
A graphical network model can be represented by an undirected graph G, such that257
G = (V,E), with a set of nodes V = {1, ..., N}, and an edge set E = V × V that258
describes the connections between the nodes. G can be represented by a binary ad-259
jacency matrix A, that has elements aij, which provides the information of whether260
pairs of vertices in G are (symmetrically) linked between each other (aij = 1), or not261
(aij = 0). If the nodes V of G are put in correspondence with the random variables262
X1, ..., XN , the edge set E induces conditional independences on X via the so-called263
Markov properties (see e.g. Lauritzen, 1996).264
265
Let Σ−1 be the inverse of Σ, whose elements can be indicated as {σij}. Whittaker
(1990) proved that the following equivalence holds:
ρijV = 0⇐⇒ Xi ⊥ Xj|XV \{i,j} ⇐⇒ eij = 0
where the symbol ⊥ indicates conditional independence and ρijV = −σij/
√
σiiσjj266
denotes the ij-th partial correlation, that is, the correlation between Xi and Xj,267
conditionally on the remaining variables XV \{i,j}. From an economical viewpoint,268
the previous equivalence implies that, if the partial correlation is not significant, the269
corresponding systemic risk measures are conditionally independent and, therefore,270
the corresponding banking systems do not contage (directly) each other. Hence, to271
understand whether contagion between any two pairs of banking systems is signif-272
icant, it is sufficient to calculate the corresponding partial correlation. All partial273
correlations can be simultaneously obtained inverting the correlation matrix among274
the systemic risk measures.275
276
After estimating a network model, we can summarize the systemic importance of its277
nodes using network centrality measures (see e.g. Giudici and Spelta, 2016). We can278
use: a) degree centrality, to measure the number of links that are present between279
a single node and all other nodes; b) betweenness centrality, to measure the inter-280
mediation importance of a node based on the extent to which it lies on the shortest281
paths between other nodes; c) closeness centrality, to measure the average geodesic282
distance between a node and all other nodes; d) eigenvector centrality, to measure283
the relative influence of a node in the network, with the principle that connections to284
few high scoring nodes contribute more to the node score than equal connections to285
10
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low scoring nodes. In our context, each node is a banking sector for a specific coun-286
try and we have several networks, corresponding to the different employed systemic287
risk measures. The most systemically important banking sector within the GCC288
region will be the one that occupies the largest number of high centrality ranks,289
among the different networks. To summarize the banking sectors centrality ranks,290
we use the Ranking Concentration ratio (RC) as introduced by Hashem and Giudici291
(2016), which allows to express the importance of all the ranks that a sector occupies292
as a percentage. The larger the RC percentage value, the higher the systemic risk293
importance of a specified banking sector.294
2.3. Statistical Specifications295
We use stock market return data of banks, aggregated by their type to compute296
the systemic risk of each banking sector (IB, CB and CBw) in each country. The297
aggregation process is based on the standard construction method for a market cap-298
italization weighted index. We start by deriving the time series of daily stock prices,299
which we transform into daily returns. Formally, if pt and pt−1 are the closing stock300
prices at times t and t − 1, the return at time t is the variation represented by301
rit = ln(pt/pt−1), where pt−1 6= 0. Then, for each country, we classify banks into302
three sectors, according to their bank type: IB, CB and CBw sectors. To construct303
the aggregate return of each sector, let nsj indicate the number of banks in the bank-304
ing sector s of a country j. We define the weighted average return of the banking305
sector sj at time t according to the following formula:306
rsjt =
nsj∑
i=1
wirit
in which wi = MVi/
∑nsj
i=1MVi represents the weight of the i-th bank in the specified307
banking sector s of country j, given by its market capitalization MVi relative to the308
sector aggregate capitalization
∑nsj
i=1MVi.309
2.3.1. Dynamic Conditional Correlations310
For all systemic risk measures, we use the Dynamic Conditional Correlation model311
of Engle (2002) to estimate time-varying correlations between each banking system312
and the market. We follow Brownlees and Engle (2017) and base the DCC model313
on the GJR-GARCH of Glosten et al. (1993), to control for the heteroskedasticity314
11
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effect in measuring correlations.315
316
In this paper, the model is estimated, at each time point t with data coming from317
a SJ × 2 matrix, whose rows contain the aggregate banking system returns rsjt and318
the corresponding reference market returns rjt. We assume that:319
rt = H
1/2
t t, (1)
where rt = (rjtrsjt) denotes the vector of market and banking sector returns, t =
(εjt ξsjt)
′ is a random vector with mean E(t) = 0 and identity covariance matrix
E(t′t) = I2, and
Ht =
(
σ2jt σjt σsjt ρsjt
σjt σsjt ρsjt σ
2
sjt
)
with σjt and σsjt represent a time varying conditional standard deviation for the320
market and for the banking sector, and ρsjt represents a time varying correlation.321
322
Note that, in the DCC model, a key parameter is the correlation coefficient ρsjt,323
which is assumed to capture, at any given time point, the dependency between the324
returns of the banking sector and those of its reference market. We extend this325
assumption in the next subsection.326
2.3.2. Partial correlations327
Systemic risk measures capture the vulnerability of a banking sector to a systemic328
event, or the contribution of a banking sector to the overall risk level of a system.329
However, they are computed on the basis of the correlations between the returns330
of a sector and those of the corresponding market, without considering the returns331
of other sectors in the same market. To correctly take this interconnectedness into332
account, we propose to replace correlations, that capture both direct and indirect re-333
lationships, with partial correlations, that are “netted” measures, and consider only334
direct relationships.335
336
The partial correlation coefficient ρijV , for any two variables Xi and Xj in a random337
vectorXV , can be defined by the correlation between the residuals from the regression338
of Xi on all other variables (excluding Xj) and the residuals from the regression of339
Xj on all other variables (excluding Xi):340
12
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ρijV = corr( eXi|XV \{j} , eXj |XV \{i}).
From an interpretational viewpoint, the partial correlation coefficient measures the341
additional contribution of variable Xj to the variability of Xi, which is not explained342
by the other variables.343
344
In our study, the dependent variable of the first regression is the banking sector345
return rsj, and the dependent variable of the second regression is the market return rj.346
Both dependent variables can be regressed on the remaining variables r2j, ...., rSj that347
represent the returns of the other banking sectors in country j, as in the following:348
{
r1jt = a1 + β2r2jt + ...+ βSrSjt + e1jt
rjt = a
′
1 + β
′
2r2jt + ...+ β
′
SrSjt + ejt
where e1jt and ejt are the residual vectors of the banking sector i and the market j.349
In our context, S = 3 and the above process is repeated for all J = 6 countries. We350
can then calculate the netted (partial) correlation between the returns of banking351
sector 1 and the returns of the country market, using the corresponding residual time352
series, as:353
ρ1jV = corr( e1j, ej).
In general, we propose to replace the correlation ρsj, with the partial correlation ρsjV ,354
using the residual return time series (esjt, ejt) in place of the return series (rsjt , rjt)355
in the DCC model. Doing so, the estimated returns will correctly take into account356
the “net” correlation between a banking sector and its reference market, without the357
inclusion of indirect spurious components.358
359
We finally remark that an alternative way of “netting” systemic risk measures is360
to explain them with a common factor which explains the volatility of all banking361
sectors. In the GCC region, such common factor is provided by the crude oil index362
(WTI). Indeed, the economies of the GCC countries are generally oil dependent, with363
oil constituting 48% of the GCC region GDP (Sturm et al., 2008).364
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3. Data and Descriptive Statistics365
We select six GCC countries with dual banking systems: Saudi Arabia (SA), Kuwait366
(KW), Qatar (QA), United Arab Emirates (AE), Bahrain (BH) and Oman (OM).367
IFSB (2016) reports that the Islamic banking market shares in these countries are:368
49% in SA, 38.9% in KW, 26.1% QA, 18.4% in AE, 15% in BH, and 7% in OM.369
Altogether, these countries hold nearly 40% of the global Islamic banking assets.370
371
For those countries, we consider all GCC banking institutions included in Bureau372
Van Djik’s Bankscope database, for the period from January 2005 to December 2014.373
We exclude those that are not publicly traded and those that have disappeared before374
December 2014, which results in having 79 banks in our sample. From Bankscope,375
we gather annual data on the book value of total liabilities and total assets for each376
bank. We also employ Thomson Reuters Datastream to obtain daily stock market377
closing prices with their corresponding market capitalizations, leading to 2608 ob-378
servations for the banking sector return series.379
380
Table .1 describes the analysed data, in terms of total assets, aggregated at the381
country banking system level, within the considered period. The table provides total382
assets distribution per country and banking system, on a yearly basis from 2005 to383
2014. For each country, assets are classified according to banking sector type (CB,384
CBw and IB), and within each type they are further classified based on whether they385
are publicly traded or privately held.386
387
Table .1 shows that the CBw sector has the largest asset size within each country.388
The IB sector comes second in most countries. This is particularly important be-389
cause larger banking sectors are expected to have higher exposure to systemic risk390
(Sedunov, 2016). The asset size generally increases over time, but the magnitude391
of the increase differs across countries and banking sectors. Note also that publicly392
traded banks, the main subject of our analysis, are largely representative, with their393
assets being nearly 70% of the total. A closer inspection of the table reveals that,394
in 2012, CBw banks disappeared in QA, following Qatar’s Central bank decision to395
ban CBw operations.396
397
Figure .1 helps to better understand the evolution of each banking sector over time.398
It plots the ratio between the assets of each banking sector and the total assets, at399
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the aggregate GCC level, on the logarithmic scale to make it more visible.400
401
Figure (.1a) shows that the CB sector has a strong decrease in its assets during402
the crisis period, but bounces back afterwards. Precisely, its share of assets goes403
from 9.81% down to 6.83% and then back to 9.25%. Figure (.1b) shows that the404
CBw sector reduces its size after 2007. Its share of assets goes from 71.92% down405
to 67.94%. Conversely, Figure (.1c) shows that the IB sector experiences an increas-406
ing trend of growth after 2007. Its share of assets start at 18.27% and ends at 22.81%.407
408
A different view on the data is provided by Table .2, which provides the market409
capitalization and the leverage of each banking sector in each country. Both market410
capitalisation and leverage are calculated for three sub-periods: the first is the pre-411
crisis period, defined from the beginning of January 2005 until the end of December412
2006, the second is the crisis period, defined from the beginning of January 2007413
until the end of December 2008, the third is the post-crisis period, defined from the414
beginning of January 2009 until the end of December 2014.415
416
Table .2 shows that both the IB and the CBw sector decreased their capitalisation417
during crisis times and beyond, as it occurred to all banks worldwide. Conversely,418
CB banks seem to increase their capitalisation during crisis. Combining the evo-419
lution of capitalisation with that of the total assets, the leverage of the CB sector420
remains substantially unchanged through the crisis, whereas both the IB and the421
CBw sectors increase their leverage. Overall, these results seem to indicate that,422
during crisis times, Islamic banks (and CBw banks) maintain credit supply to the423
economy, at the expense of a higher leverage, which may bring a higher systemic risk424
level.425
426
To complete the description of our data, Figures .2 and .3 report the time evolution427
of the main macroeconomic variables of the GCC countries: the oil price and the428
GDP growth of each country. Figure .2 reports the time evolution of the crude oil429
price, in dollars per barrel (crude oil WTI index)4. It shows that the crude oil price430
is quite volatile, with the largest peaks in 2008, at the burst of the financial crisis.431
4WTI Crude Oil index can be downloaded from two sources:
http://www.gulfbase.com/tools/indexcommodity/6?pageid=64
http://finance.yahoo.com
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Figure .3 presents the time evolution of the annual GDP growth of the six considered432
countries. From this Figure, note that most economies are synchronised with the oil433
price. This is the case especially for the Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and,434
on a higher GDP level, Qatar.435
4. Empirical Findings436
4.1. Banking Sector Systemic Risk437
In this subsection, we apply the proposed systemic risk measures in order to test438
our first hypothesis, that is, to establish whether the CBw sector has the highest439
systemic risk.440
441
Table .3 summarises the results from the application of the MES measures. We442
compute the measures in three methods: first, the “Standard” measure, following443
Acharya et al. (2010); second, our proposed netted MES measure obtained using444
partial correlations; third, the MES measure calculated using, instead of the market445
index, the crude oil index as a unified index. All MES measures are calculated as446
averages over three sub-periods: the pre-crisis, the crisis, and the post crisis periods.447
448
Columns (1) to (3) report the results using the standard MES measure for the pre-449
crisis, the crisis and the post-crisis periods respectively. The figures show that the450
CBw sector experienced the highest increase during the crisis period (column 2), in451
most countries. For example, the MES of the CBw sector of Saudi Arabia increases452
by 126 basis points against a 50 basis points increase of the IB sector. Columns (4)453
to (6) display the estimation when we use netted MES for our analysis. The results454
are in line with our findings for the first three columns, although on a smaller scale,455
due to the exclusion of indirect and spurious effects. Columns (7) to (9) report the456
MES measures when the crude oil index is used as a unified index for the whole457
region. Our findings persist in this specification and confirm that the CBw sector is458
the most vulnerable sector to systemic risks.459
460
Table .4 summarises the results obtained from the application of the SRISK measure.461
The table provides three SRISK measures for each banking sector, with negative signs462
representing capital buffers. First the “Standard” measure, calculated as in Acharya463
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et al. (2012); second, the “Netted” SRISK measure obtained using partial correla-464
tions; third, the SRISK measure calculated using the “Crude oil” index as a unified465
index for the whole region. All SRISK measures are calculated as averages over three466
sub-periods: the pre-crisis, the crisis, and the post crisis periods.467
468
The results show that, overall, the CBw sector has higher capital buffers than the469
IB sector, and that the CB sector has the lowest capital buffers. These results, ap-470
parently in conflict with those from the MES measure, can be explained recalling471
that SRISK, differently from MES, depends on both the size and the leverage of a472
banking sector. Indeed, if we take the ratios between each banking sector’s SRISK473
measure in Table .4 with the corresponding market capitalisations in Table .2, the474
resulting measure becomes more coherent with MES. For instance, the Netted SRISK475
measure gives an aggregated SRISK ratio of 81% for CBw and 78% for IB in the476
pre-crisis period; an aggregated SRISK ratio of 63% for CBw and 73% for IB in the477
crisis period and, finally, an aggregated SRISK ratio of 50% for CBw and 62% for478
IB, in the post-crisis period. Similar results are obtained using the standard and the479
oil index measure. Note that the CB sector has, relative to its small capitalisation,480
high buffers.481
482
Table .5 provides the ∆CoV aR for each banking sector. The table provides three483
∆CoVaR measures for each banking sector. First the “Standard” measure, calculated484
following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016); second, the “Netted” ∆CoVaR measure485
obtained using partial correlations; third, the ∆CoVaR measure calculated using the486
“Crude oil” index. All ∆CoVaR are calculated as averages over three sub-periods:487
the pre-crisis, the crisis, and the post crisis periods. From Table .5 we observe that488
the “Standard”, the “Netted”, and the “Crude oil” ∆CoV aR identify the CBw bank-489
ing sector as the main contributor to market systemic risk, followed by the IB and490
CB sectors, which is consistent with the results from the MES and SRISK systemic491
risk indicators.492
493
Overall, all measures confirm our first hypothesis: the CBw banking sector has the494
highest systemic risk.5495
5 We remark that as a robustness check, we have applied the proposed measures to four Asian
countries with dual banking systems: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan. The results,
not reported here but available upon request, show that CBw is the most vulnerable banking sector.
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4.2. Banking Sectors Synchronicity496
In this subsection, we apply the GES measure to test our second hypothesis, that497
is, to establish whether the CBw sector has the highest synchronicity with the mar-498
ket. The Tables presented so far compare banking sectors of different countries in499
absolute terms. However, we would like to compare the banking sectors in terms500
of their relative contribution to the performance of their market. To this aim, we501
employ the proposed GES measure as an aggregate for the weighted MES of the502
different banking sectors. In addition, we compare the GES with the overall MES of503
a country, which we obtain without classifying banks into three banking sectors6.504
505
Figures .8-.13 in the appendix illustrate the full time evolution of the GES measure506
per country, along with its components: GMESCB, GMESCBw, GMESIB, and the507
country MES. The measures are calculated with three different methods: the “Stan-508
dard”, the “Netted”, and the “Crude oil” index. By looking at the GES and at its509
components, we are able to individuate which banking sector is most synchronised510
with the overall market in terms of systemic risk. From an econometric viewpoint,511
figures .8-.13 show that the GES well approximates the country MES and can thus512
be taken as an appropriate representative. From an economic viewpoint, all figures513
show a high risk synchronization during the crisis period of 2008, that reaches its514
maximum level in 2009. This is consistent with the macroeconomic behaviour of all515
countries, whose GDP growth declined or even became negative in 2009.516
517
The figures are summarised in Table .6, which shows the GES, and the percentage518
contribution of each banking sector to the GES, as an average over the three sub-519
periods. From the table we note that the GES of AE, KW, OM and QA is driven520
by the CBw sector, which has the largest percentage in all periods. Whereas, in521
SA, the GES is driven by both CBw and IB, with the former prevailing during crisis522
times. Last, in BH the main systemic risk driver is the IB sector. As for the CB523
sector, it appears to have the smallest effect, which is consistent with its relatively524
lower size. Table .6 also shows that the distribution of the GES into its components525
is very stable under the standard MES and less so when we use the netted MES,526
which takes multidimensionality into account. The distribution of the GES under527
6GES is a coherent risk measure, in which the sum of its weighted components (sum of banking
sectors GMES) is equal to the country GES, hence, the effect of each component can be traced back
to the aggregate country level. Whereas MES is not a coherent risk measure, but it is effective in
tracing the ability of GES to represent the country risk level.
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the oil-based measure is also less stable, reflecting the response of the markets to the528
high volatility of the crude oil price.529
530
The analysis of synchronicity can be carried out, thanks to the aggregation property531
of the GES measure, at the GCC region level as a whole. In Figure .4 we provide532
the time variation of the GES measure, along with its components, for the three533
main banking sectors, at the aggregate GCC level. We also calculate the overall534
MES of the GCC countries, without classifying the banks into three sectors7. At the535
GCC level, we observe that figure .4a shows a strong dependence of the “Standard”536
GES on the CBw sector, illustrating that this sector has the highest synchronicity at537
this aggregation level. The figure also shows that all banking sectors become more538
synchronized in 2009, coincident with the decline in the GDP growth. The “Netted”539
GES shown in figure .4b illustrates that the CBw sector has the highest synchronisa-540
tion during crisis period. The “Crude oil” index GES shown in figure .4c illustrates541
a similar behaviour along most of the time period, in line with the finding that the542
stock market returns in the GCC region are mainly affected by oil price volatility (see543
e.g. Arouri et al., 2011). Indeed, from Figure .2 we note that the crude oil price peaks544
steadily during crisis times, exactly when the GES does, and other smaller or shorter545
peaks of the GES can also be correlated with variations of the oil price. Exceptions to546
this trend are BH and OM, whose GDP is in fact less synchronised with the oil price.547
548
The results from the GES measure thus lead to the conclusion that Hypothesis 2 is549
confirmed: the CBW sector is the one that is most synchronised with the market8.550
4.3. Banking Sector Interconnectdness551
In this subsection, we apply graphical netowrk models to examine our third hypoth-552
esis, that is, whether the CBw sector is the most interconnected sector. Figures .5-.7553
illustrate the graphical network models using MES, SRISK, and ∆CoVaR respec-554
tively. In all figures, we use the “Netted” method, which takes interdependences into555
account, and build a separate model for each of the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis556
7Note that we cannot calculate the Netted MES of the GCC as we do not have a correlation
structure at the aggregate level.
8We remark that, as a robustness check, we have applied the GES measure to four Asian coun-
tries with dual banking systems: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan. The results, not
reported here but available upon request, show that CBw is the banking sector most synhcronised
to the market.
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periods. Within each graph, the size of a node represents the magnitude of the sys-557
temic risk measure for the specified banking sector. The link between any two nodes558
represents the presence of a significant partial correlation coefficient between them,559
the thickness of the edge line indicates the link magnitude, and the color shows its560
sign.561
562
To better illustrate the results in Figures .5-.7 we summarise the obtained graphical563
network models using centrality measures to rank the banking sectors from the most564
to the least systemically important. The four centrality measures (ie. Betweeness,565
closeness, Node Degree, and Eigenvector Centrality) are further summarised into an566
aggregate Rank Concentration (RC) score that is provided in table .7 (for more de-567
tails see Hashem and Giudici, 2016). A higher RC score indicates a higher contagion568
capacity and a greater potential for diffusing risk in the system.569
570
Figure .5, and the RC scores of the netted MES in Table .7, indicate that the CBw571
sector occupies the highest rank during the crisis period, whereas the IB sector572
dominates the post-crisis higher ranks, with the CB sector always being the least573
systemically important.574
575
Figure .6, and the RC scores of the netted SRISK in Table .7, indicate that the576
IB sector has the highest importance in terms of its capital buffer (capital surplus),577
followed by CBw in the pre-crisis and crisis periods, implying that the CBw sector578
is riskier than the IB one under crisis events9. Note that the netted SRISK of the IB579
sector lowers after the crisis for all centrality measures. This effect can be explained580
by the fact that, in the post-crisis graphical network model, the IB sector is typi-581
cally negatively correlated with the CB sector, whereas the CBw sectors is typically582
positively correlated with both IB and CB sectors. This points out a diversification583
gain for the IB sector.584
585
Finally, Figure .7, and the RC scores of the netted ∆CoVaR in Table .7, are consistent586
with the netted MES and SRISK results, and further confirm that the CBw sector is587
the most interconnected, especially during the crisis period. On the other hand, the588
9The CB sector has the lowest capital buffer, but because of its low market share and its lower
level of interconnectedness, its ability to diffuse its risk at the system level is limited in comparison
with the two larger size CBw and IB sectors.
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CB sector is the least connected sector. We can thus conclude that the Hypothesis589
3 holds: CBw is the most interconnected sector.590
5. Conclusions591
The main objective of this study is to investigate the consequence for financial sta-592
bility of the following options: 1) combining Islamic and conventional banking under593
the same roof; 2) providing Islamic and conventional banking through two separate594
institutions. To explore this issue, we measure the systemic risk of CBw, IB and CB595
in six GCC member countries with dual banking systems, in particular during the596
financial crisis. We use market based systemic risk measures, such as MES, SRISK597
and ∆CoVaR and compute them with different methods: a) the standard b) the598
netted (using partial correlations) and c) the crude oil index models. Our analysis is599
based on a sample of observations on 79 banks and banks holding companies in the600
2005-2014 time span.601
602
The systemic risk measures of MES and ∆CoV aR show that the CBw sector is the603
most systemically vulnerable, and the one with the highest systemic importance.604
The SRISK shows that the CBw sector has the highest capital buffers but, if we nor-605
malise the buffers by the corresponding capitalisations, the results become coherent606
with those from MES and ∆CoV aR.607
608
Using the GES measure, at the country and at the GCC level, we can evaluate which609
banking sector is highly synchronised with the market. The results show that the610
CBw sector has the highest synchronicity with the market, especially in the crisis611
period, whereas the IB sector is less aligned until 2009, when it also comoves with612
the market.613
614
The interconnectedness analysis based on graphical network models reveals that the615
CBw sector is the most interconnected sector during the crisis, whereas the IB sector616
is more interconnected in the post crisis period. Moreover, we find that the IB sector617
is negatively correlated to the CB sector, indicating a diversification benefit for a618
system that has both.619
620
Our results show that financial stability of dual banking systems depends amongst621
other factors on how Islamic banking is introduced to the system, which has im-622
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portant policy implications. The findings underscore the necessity of prudential623
regulation and supervision for the CBw sector, given its systemic importance and624
interconnectedness.625
626
The results also highlight the presence of similarities between the stock market re-627
turns in the GCC region and the crude oil index, which needs to be further inves-628
tigated to determine if they can be used by the regulators as an early warning sign629
for equity market swings in this region.630
631
We finally remark that the results in the paper and, in particular, the netted mea-632
sures, are based on a specific correlation network model. This may lead to instable633
results, especially with highly volatile time series. Future research should address634
the issue of taking model uncertainty into account, possibly by means of a Bayesian635
approach.636
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Figure .1: Asset Growth of the GCC Country Banking Sectors
This figure plots the time variation for the ratio of each banking sector total assets to the GCC total
assets, on annual basis, for the period from Jan.2005 to Dec.2014. The figure includes total assets annual
percentage change of (a) the CB banking sector, (b) the CBw banking sector and (c) the IB banking
sector.
(a) The CB Banking Sector
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
(b) The CBw Banking Sector
1.82
1.83
1.84
1.85
1.86
1.87
1.88
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
(c) The IB Banking Sector
1.22
1.24
1.26
1.28
1.30
1.32
1.34
1.36
1.38
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
34
Page 35 of 49
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Table .2: Capitalisation of the GCC country banking sectors
This Table provides the market capitalisation of each banking sector in each coun-
try (in million U.S. dollars). In addition, it provides the leverage, calculated as the
ratio of the book value of debt divided by the market share, plus one. The lever-
age is calculated for three sub-periods: the first is the pre-crisis period, defined
from the beginning of January 2005 until the end of December 2006, the second
is the crisis period, defined from the beginning of January 2007 until the end of
December 2008, the third is the post crisis period, defined from the beginning of
January 2009 until the end of December 2014.
Sector Country
Market Capitalization Leverage
pre-crisis crisis post-crisis pre-crisis crisis post-crisis
CB
AE 1,738,686 1,911,293 1,734,313 2.31 3.21 5.17
KW 2,366,259 3,815,578 2,800,840 4.17 3.60 4.44
BH 224,252 267,469 226,714 2.62 2.35 2.42
OM 1,207,104 1,397,523 1,524,171 3.53 3.88 5.17
CBw
AE 55,208,423 50,925,119 49,805,786 2.87 5.41 7.36
SA 96,851,843 73,975,213 59,673,371 2.64 4.44 6.06
QA 21,529,509 22,041,625 38,137,765 2.24 3.45 4.11
KW 12,139,935 15,956,478 10,062,579 3.52 3.98 5.58
BH 6,644,680 8,683,116 7,467,486 6.58 7.90 9.18
OM 4,155,795 6,745,862 6,397,893 3.22 4.01 5.55
IB
AE 15,555,298 11,407,684 9,753,137 2.65 6.23 8.14
SA 68,496,296 45,031,798 37,807,771 1.43 1.95 3.01
QA 12,844,002 10,772,994 13,351,518 1.59 2.03 3.27
KW 19,533,126 22,659,197 18,364,591 2.18 2.94 4.56
BH 5,772,538 5,153,380 2,695,177 3.47 4.86 11.95
OM 397,405 397,404 383,108 1.01 1.01 1.06
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Figure .2: Time Evolution of WTI Crude Oil Price
This figure plots the WTI crude oil closing price through time.
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Figure .3: Time Evolution of GDP Growth per GCC country
This figure plots the GDP growth through time for each GCC country.
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This Table provides three MES measures for each country banking sector, expressed in million U.S. dollars. First the
“Standard” measure, calculated as in Acharya et al. (2012); second, the netted MES measure obtained using partial
correlations; third, the MES measure calculated using instead of the market index, the crude oil index. All MES are
calculated as averages over three sub-periods: the first is the pre-crisis period, defined from the beginning of January
2005 until the end of December 2006, the second is the crisis period, defined from the beginning of January 2007 until
the end of December 2008, the third is the post crisis period, defined from the beginning of January 2009 until the
end of December 2014. The table also reports the MES calculated at the country level, referred to as MES.system.
Country Sector
Standard-MES Netted-MES Oil-MES
pre-crisis crisis post-crisis pre-crisis crisis post-crisis pre-crisis crisis post-crisis
AE
CB 0.898 0.925 0.774 0.081 0.133 0.116 0.206 0.195 0.170
CBw 1.368 1.309 1.328 0.192 0.165 0.170 0.268 0.257 0.316
IB 2.601 2.162 1.424 0.076 -0.012 0.102 0.651 0.525 0.346
BH
CB 0.004 0.004 0.006 -0.184 -0.166 -0.182 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
CBw 0.219 0.263 0.220 0.091 0.111 0.093 0.071 0.083 0.071
IB 0.837 1.122 1.130 -0.011 0.420 0.333 0.219 0.231 0.240
KW
CB 0.461 0.449 0.419 -0.177 -0.129 -0.137 0.134 0.130 0.121
CBw 1.526 3.010 3.420 0.140 0.190 0.355 0.580 0.565 0.663
IB 0.837 1.122 1.130 0.081 0.103 0.103 0.288 0.377 0.337
OM
CB 0.885 2.065 1.407 0.190 0.270 0.212 0.091 0.189 0.124
CBw 0.383 2.274 2.277 -0.046 0.678 0.730 0.232 0.248 0.220
IB 0.008 0.006 0.149 0.013 0.004 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.056
QA
CBw 1.536 1.979 1.495 -0.054 0.118 0.136 0.369 0.349 0.248
IB 1.700 2.150 1.377 0.203 0.015 0.227 0.383 0.488 0.250
SA
CBw 1.854 3.107 1.612 0.024 0.195 0.135 0.288 0.532 0.317
IB 3.219 3.723 2.549 0.865 0.748 0.436 0.275 0.192 0.564
Total
CB 2.249 3.443 2.605 -0.09 0.107 0.008 0.43 0.513 0.414
CBw 6.887 11.942 10.353 0.348 1.457 1.618 1.807 2.035 1.835
IB 9.203 10.286 7.76 1.228 1.278 1.191 1.807 1.806 1.681
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the “Standard” measure, calculated as in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016); second, the netted ∆CoVaR measure
obtained using partial correlations; third, the ∆CoVaR measure calculated using instead of the market index, the
crude oil index. All ∆CoVaR are calculated as averages over three sub-periods: the first is the pre-crisis period,
defined from the beginning of January 2005 until the end of December 2006, the second is the crisis period, defined
from the beginning of January 2007 until the end of December 2008, the third is the post crisis period, defined from
the beginning of January 2009 until the end of December 2014.
Country Sector
Standard-∆CoVaR Netted-∆CoVaR Oil-∆CoVaR
pre-crisis crisis post-crisis pre-crisis crisis post-crisis pre-crisis crisis post-crisis
AE
CB 0.395 0.499 0.359 0.004 0.045 0.025 0.150 0.191 0.190
CBw 1.354 1.704 1.460 0.091 0.089 0.086 0.192 0.389 0.571
IB 1.382 1.458 1.206 0.093 -0.070 0.122 0.280 0.361 0.357
BH
CB 0.005 0.007 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.014 -0.018 -0.018
CBw 0.136 0.171 0.160 0.031 0.034 0.034 -0.057 -0.076 -0.071
IB 0.257 0.478 0.415 -0.110 0.138 0.075 0.125 0.159 0.158
KW
CB 0.243 0.259 0.229 -0.007 0.019 -0.004 0.143 0.182 0.181
CBw 0.464 1.106 0.950 0.059 0.120 0.242 0.288 0.358 0.373
IB 0.257 0.478 0.415 0.145 0.156 0.140 0.280 0.357 0.355
OM
CB 0.500 1.195 0.735 0.157 0.162 0.088 0.154 0.207 0.206
CBw 0.171 0.897 0.576 0.041 0.234 0.158 0.270 0.344 0.342
IB 0.057 0.063 0.036 0.050 0.304 0.208 0.049 0.063 0.057
QA
CBw 0.958 1.331 1.104 0.168 0.317 0.208 0.357 0.454 0.447
IB 1.024 1.159 1.013 0.147 -0.073 0.211 0.286 0.375 0.365
SA
CBw 1.643 2.146 1.132 -0.017 0.198 0.171 0.164 0.485 0.549
IB 1.536 2.007 1.045 0.580 0.453 0.315 0.062 0.078 0.677
Total
CB 2.215 3.164 1.997 0.069 0.797 0.594 0.618 1.064 1.119
CBw 7.963 12.147 8.495 1.269 1.944 1.506 1.93 2.876 3.721
IB 7.315 10.763 7.998 1.304 1.412 1.789 2.358 3.033 3.606
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Table .6: GES and its components for each GCC country banking system
This Table provides the GES measure, and the percentage contribution to it, from each country banking sector
component, for the considered time periods. Note that, at the bottom of the table, the “Total” is the sum of the
percentages across all countries.
Component Type Standard-MES Netted-MES Oil-MES
Country Sector pre-crisis crisis post-crisis pre-crisis crisis post-crisis pre-crisis crisis post-crisis
AE
GES AE 1.62 1.43 1.33 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.35 0.30 0.32
% GMES CB 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
% GMES CBw 0.64 0.73 0.81 0.89 0.96 0.87 0.58 0.69 0.81
% GMES IB 0.35 0.25 0.17 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.41 0.29 0.17
BH
GES BH 0.50 0.57 0.46 0.04 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.11
% GMES CB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
% GMES CBw 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.85 0.30 0.39 0.27 0.38 0.44
% GMES IB 0.77 0.72 0.66 0.09 0.68 0.59 0.73 0.62 0.56
KW
GES KW 1.06 1.81 1.83 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.38 0.43 0.43
% GMES CB 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.03
% GMES CBw 0.52 0.65 0.62 0.45 0.53 0.62 0.54 0.51 0.52
% GMES IB 0.45 0.32 0.36 0.43 0.39 0.31 0.44 0.46 0.45
OM
GES OM 0.46 2.11 2.02 0.02 0.58 0.60 0.18 0.23 0.19
% GMES CB 0.38 0.17 0.13 0.60 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.12
% GMES CBw 0.62 0.83 0.87 0.38 0.92 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.87
% GMES IB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
QA
GES QA 1.60 2.04 1.46 0.04 0.09 0.16 0.38 0.39 0.25
% GMES CBw 0.60 0.66 0.74 0.32 0.93 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.72
% GMES IB 0.40 0.34 0.26 0.68 0.07 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.28
SA
GES SA 2.41 3.34 1.98 0.37 0.41 0.26 0.29 0.40 0.42
% GMES CBw 0.46 0.57 0.49 0.04 0.29 0.31 0.59 0.81 0.45
% GMES IB 0.54 0.43 0.51 0.96 0.71 0.69 0.41 0.19 0.55
Total
% GMES CB 0.42 0.22 0.17 0.79 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.2 0.17
% GMES CBw 3.07 3.72 3.87 2.93 3.93 3.76 3.49 3.84 3.81
% GMES IB 2.51 2.06 1.96 2.28 1.86 2.07 2.37 1.96 2.02
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Figure .4: GES for the GCC Banking System Portfolio
In this figure, we present the time evolution plot, from Jan.2005 to Dec.2014, for GCC marginal expected
shortfall (MES) per banking sector type, we also represent the complete GCC banking system portfolio
using both GES and MES. The figure is provided using the (a) standard, (b) netted and (c) oil systemic
risk measurement variations. In this figure, MES of the conventional banking sector (MES-CB) is denoted
in black, MES of the conventional banking sector with an Islamic window (MES-CBw) is denoted in blue,
MES of the Islamic banking sector (MES-IB) is denoted in green. The GES of the complete banking
system portfolio (GES-GCC) is denoted in red, and the MES of GCC banking system portfolio (MES-
GCC) is denoted with a black dashed line.
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Figure .5: Netted MES Network
In this figure, we present the netted MES partial correlation network for the three sub-periods of a) pre-crisis, b)
during-crisis and c) post-crisis. The blue node color indicate a positive risk value, whereas the red indicates a
negative one. The gray link color indicates a positive partial correlation, whereas the red indicates a negative one.
The larger size of a node indicate higher risk magnitude, and the thickness of the link indicate the strength of the
partial correlation.
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Figure .6: Netted SRISK Network
In this figure, we present the netted SRISK partial correlation network for the three sub-periods of a) pre-crisis, b)
during-crisis and c) post-crisis. The blue node color indicate a capital buffer, whereas the red indicates a capital
shortfall. The gray link color indicates a positive partial correlation, whereas the red indicates a negative one. The
larger node size indicates a higher capital buffer, and the thickness of the link indicate the strength of the partial
correlation.
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Figure .7: Netted ∆CoVaR Network
In this figure, we present the netted ∆CoVaR partial correlation network for the three sub-periods of a) pre-crisis,
b) during-crisis and c) post-crisis. The blue node color indicate a positive risk value, whereas the red indicates a
negative one. The gray link color indicates a positive partial correlation, whereas the red indicates a negative one.
The larger size of a node indicate higher risk magnitude, and the thickness of the link indicate the strength of the
partial correlation.
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Figure .8: MES and GES for AE Banking System Portfolio
In this figure, we present the time evolution plot, from Jan.2005 to Dec.2014, for United Arab Emirates
(AE) marginal expected shortfall (MES) per banking sector type, we also represent the complete AE
banking system portfolio using both GES and MES. The figure is provided using the (a) standard, (b)
netted and (c) oil systemic risk measurement variations. In this figure, MES of the conventional banking
sector (MES-CB) is denoted in black, MES of the conventional banking sector with an Islamic window
(MES-CBw) is denoted in blue, MES of the Islamic banking sector (MES-IB) is denoted in green. The
GES of the complete banking system portfolio (GES-AE) is denoted in red, and the MES of AE banking
system portfolio (MES-AE) is denoted with a black dashed line.
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Figure .9: MES and GES for BH Banking System Portfolio
In this figure, we present the time evolution plot, from Jan.2005 to Dec.2014, for Bahrain (BH) marginal
expected shortfall (MES) per banking sector type, we also represent the complete BH banking system
portfolio using both GES and MES. The figure is provided using the (a) standard, (b) netted and (c)
oil systemic risk measurement variations. In this figure, MES of the conventional banking sector (MES-
CB) is denoted in black, MES of the conventional banking sector with an Islamic window (MES-CBw)
is denoted in blue, MES of the Islamic banking sector (MES-IB) is denoted in green. The GES of the
complete banking system portfolio (GES-BH) is denoted in red, and the MES of BH banking system
portfolio (MES-BH) is denoted with a black dashed line.
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Figure .10: MES and GES for KW Banking System Portfolio
In this figure, we present the time evolution plot, from Jan.2005 to Dec.2014, for Kuwait (KW) marginal
expected shortfall (MES) per banking sector type, we also represent the complete KW banking system
portfolio using both GES and MES. The figure is provided using the (a) standard, (b) netted and (c)
oil systemic risk measurement variations. In this figure, MES of the conventional banking sector (MES-
CB) is denoted in black, MES of the conventional banking sector with an Islamic window (MES-CBw)
is denoted in blue, MES of the Islamic banking sector (MES-IB) is denoted in green. The GES of the
complete banking system portfolio (GES-KW) is denoted in red, and the MES of KW banking system
portfolio (MES-KW) is denoted with a black dashed line.
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Figure .11: MES and GES for OM Banking System Portfolio
In this figure, we present the time evolution plot, from Jan.2005 to Dec.2014, for Oman (OM) marginal
expected shortfall (MES) per banking sector type, we also represent the complete OM banking system
portfolio using both GES and MES. The figure is provided using the (a) standard, (b) netted and (c)
oil systemic risk measurement variations. In this figure, MES of the conventional banking sector (MES-
CB) is denoted in black, MES of the conventional banking sector with an Islamic window (MES-CBw)
is denoted in blue, MES of the Islamic banking sector (MES-IB) is denoted in green. The GES of the
complete banking system portfolio (GES-OM) is denoted in red, and the MES of OM banking system
portfolio (MES-OM) is denoted with a black dashed line.
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Figure .12: MES and GES for QA Banking System Portfolio
In this figure, we present the time evolution plot, from Jan.2005 to Dec.2014, for Qatar (QA) marginal
expected shortfall (MES) per banking sector type, we also represent the complete QA banking system
portfolio using both GES and MES. The figure is provided using the (a) standard, (b) netted and (c)
oil systemic risk measurement variations. In this figure, MES of the conventional banking sector (MES-
CB) is denoted in black, MES of the conventional banking sector with an Islamic window (MES-CBw)
is denoted in blue, MES of the Islamic banking sector (MES-IB) is denoted in green. The GES of the
complete banking system portfolio (GES-QA) is denoted in red, and the MES of QA banking system
portfolio (MES-QA) is denoted with a black dashed line.
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Figure .13: MES and GES for SA Banking System Portfolio
In this figure, we present the time evolution plot, from Jan.2005 to Dec.2014, for Saudi Arabia (SA)
marginal expected shortfall (MES) per banking sector type, we also represent the complete SA banking
system portfolio using both GES and MES. The figure is provided using the (a) standard, (b) netted
and (c) oil systemic risk measurement variations. In this figure, MES of the conventional banking sector
(MES-CB) is denoted in black, MES of the conventional banking sector with an Islamic window (MES-
CBw) is denoted in blue, MES of the Islamic banking sector (MES-IB) is denoted in green. The GES of
the complete banking system portfolio (GES-SA) is denoted in red, and the MES of SA banking system
portfolio (MES-SA) is denoted with a black dashed line.
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